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2010 NOTE OF THE YEAR 
THE LEGACY OF  
GRANHOLM V. HEALD:  
QUESTIONING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF  
FACIALLY NEUTRAL  
DIRECT-SHIPPING LAWS 
So I dreamed: Wouldn’t it be terrific if I could be the heroine 
who stems the tide, slows the overwhelming production of 
hormonally overblown or sanitized wines—the ones that the 
world’s most famous wine critic is credited with 
championing? If only I could stop the proliferation of four-
square wines with utterly no sense of place or minerality that 
reflect nothing about where they come from.
1
 
APÉRITIF 
The wine industry is bifurcating. On the one hand, producers are 
consolidating and creating more similar-tasting wines. In 2007, 
approximately eleven percent of U.S. wineries produced ninety-eight 
percent of U.S. wine.
2
 In fact, half of the total wine market consists of 
just twenty-two brand names.
3
 Some people believe these ubiquitous 
                                                                                                                 
1 ALICE FEIRING, THE BATTLE FOR WINE AND LOVE: OR HOW I SAVED THE WORLD 
FROM PARKERIZATION 3 (2008). The eponymous wine critic Robert M. Parker, Jr. has become 
so influential that many vintners have altered their winemaking techniques to suit his palate. 
This trend is called the ―Parkerization‖ of wine; it is also known as the ―international style‖ of 
winemaking. E.g., Bill Daley, A Sense of Place: As International Style Homogenizes Wine, 
Many Still Defend Terroir, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2005, § 7, at 8. 
2 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112074, at *23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
3 KEVIN ZRALY, WINDOWS ON THE WORLD: COMPLETE WINE COURSE 2 (2010 ed. 2009). 
 12/30/2010 9:21:44 PM 
310 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1 
wines taste ―sanitized‖ in part because winemakers have taken to 
chemically manipulating their wines to achieve higher rankings from 
critics, and thus higher sales.
4
 But while the big producers have gotten 
bigger, there has also been a proliferation of small start-up wineries.
5
 
In 1975, the United States had fewer than 580 wineries; today it 
boasts over 5,900.
6
 These smaller vintners are trying to ―stem the 
tide‖ by producing more nuanced, boutique wines in smaller 
quantities. The Federal Trade Commission attributes the dramatic 
growth of boutique wineries to an increased demand for 
―individualistic, hand-crafted wines.‖7  
This backlash against the mass production and homogenization of 
wine is noteworthy because it reflects the venerable belief that wine‘s 
nuance and diversity are what make it such a poetic and enduring 
drink. This philosophy—that no two wines could, or should, taste 
alike—stems from the concept of terroir, a French term that 
encompasses a grape‘s ―growing area, starting with the soil (la terre) 
and the slope, and taking into account other elements of the 
vineyard‘s microclimate, such as sun, rain, wind, and temperature 
fluctuations. Each terroir produces a unique wine . . . .‖8 In addition 
to terroir, ―[v]ariations in varietal designation, vintage year, vineyard 
location, varietal blending, winemaking style and limitations on 
availability [also] contribute to wine‘s uniqueness.‖9 As a result of 
this uniqueness, ―[w]ines are not fungible.‖10  
The fact that oenophiles enjoy exploring wine‘s diversity helps 
explain why U.S. wineries currently produce 25,000 different wines.
11
 
But because alcohol is heavily regulated, consumer access to this vast 
array of wines is artificially limited. It can be difficult—if not 
                                                                                                                 
4 For example, Enologix Systems provides winemakers with ―wine quality metrics‖ that 
help them improve the rankings their wines receive from critics. Enologix can also compare a 
wine‘s ―flavor chemistry profile‖ to those of wines that have received high scores from 
influential critics. ENOLOGIX SYSTEMS, http://www.enologix.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2010); 
see also FEIRING, supra note 1, at 1–5.  
5 Susan C. Cagann, Contents Under Pressure: Regulating the Sales and Marketing of 
Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST 
AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 57, 70 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 
2008). 
6 ZRALY, supra note 3, at 61. 
7 FED. TRADE COMM‘N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE 
6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf.  
8 TYLER COLMAN, WINE POLITICS: HOW GOVERNMENTS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, 
MOBSTERS, AND CRITICS INFLUENCE THE WINES WE DRINK 42 (2008). 
9 John A. Hinman & Robert T. Wright, Jr., Free Commerce in Wine: Trapped in a Legal 
Web, HINMAN & CARMICHAEL LLP, 4 (June 23, 2000), http://www.beveragelaw.com/archives 
/wlf%20article%20062300%20publication.pdf. 
10 Id. 
11 James Alexander Tanford, E-commerce in Wine, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 275, 303 
(2007). 
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impossible—for a consumer to purchase a particular wine, especially 
one from a boutique winery.
12
 Wineries, consumers, and advocacy 
groups have begun challenging a variety of state laws that, they 
contend, unconstitutionally restrict their ability to sell and purchase 
wine.
13
 They point to wine‘s uniqueness to help explain why state 
restrictions on the distribution of wine are particularly unacceptable.
14
  
Most states regulate alcohol through a three-tier distribution 
system, which generally requires suppliers (whether a brewer, vintner, 
distiller, or importer—the first tier) to sell only to wholesalers (also 
known as distributors or shippers—the second tier) who, in turn, may 
sell only to retailers (including liquor stores, restaurants, and bars—
the third tier).
15
 Over the past few decades, as producers have 
multiplied, wholesalers have consolidated, creating an hourglass-
shaped system with wholesalers at the point of constriction.
16
 
Consequently, the three-tier system has become a huge impediment to 
consumer choice. 
What started out as a system to allow controlled and 
regulated distribution has become its major obstacle.  
Of the 25,000 wines, only about 500 make it through the 
system to retail shelves. . . . Fewer than 100 wineries have 
stable national distribution in any form. Three thousand 
wineries have no wholesaler at all.
17
  
                                                                                                                 
12 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM‘N, supra note 7, at 18. The FTC conducted a study in 
McLean, Virginia, tracking the price and availability of the country‘s most popular wines. It 
found that eighteen percent of the wines on its list were not available in bricks-and-mortar stores 
near McLean, compared with only five percent unavailable over the Internet. And of the wines 
that were not available in the McLean area, fifty-three percent of them were on Wine and Spirits 
magazine‘s top-twenty most popular list. Id. 
13 Groups such as the Coalition for Free Trade, Free the Grapes, the Wine Institute, and 
Family Winemakers of California support litigation and legislation in this arena. A number of 
journalists and academics have dubbed these legal challenges the ―Wine Wars.‖ See, e.g., Susan 
Lorde Martin, Wine Wars—Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First Amendment, the 
Commerce Clause, and Consumers’ Rights, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2000); Eryn Brown, The Wine 
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at BU4. 
14 See, e.g., Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (W.D. Ky. 
2006) (―We note that wine is a unique product. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs 
that . . . the effect on interstate commerce is not de minimus.‖), aff’d sub nom. Cherry Hill 
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008). 
15 DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND GOVERNMENT 
MONOPOLY 5 fig.1 (2003). 
16 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2010). The 
consolidation of the wholesaler tier has been quite significant. In the 1950s, there were several 
thousand wholesalers; today, there are only a few hundred. FED. TRADE COMM‘N, supra note 7, 
at 6. 
17 Tanford, supra note 11, at 303 (footnote omitted). 
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But despite this effect of the three-tier system, the Supreme Court 
continues to believe that it is ―unquestionably legitimate.‖18 Although 
some practitioners and scholars believe that the Court‘s opinion of the 
three-tier system may change in the future, the system remains 
constitutional for the time being.
19
 
Now that each state is home to at least one winery,
20
 however, the 
states themselves want to do something about the bottleneck created 
by the three-tier system. Allowing producers to sell wine over the 
Internet and ship it directly to their customers is an obvious 
alternative to wholesale distribution. One way for a state to support its 
burgeoning wine industry while appeasing its powerful wholesalers
21
 
is to create an exception to its three-tier system that allows in-state 
wineries to ship directly while continuing to require out-of-state 
wineries to sell only to wholesalers. Advocates of direct shipping 
have taken to challenging these exceptions as an alternative to 
attacking the three-tier system as a whole. While this strategy may 
seem counterintuitive, it may actually help expand direct shipping—at 
least in some states. The goal is that courts will declare these 
exceptions unconstitutional because they discriminate in favor of the 
state‘s own wineries and that state legislatures will respond by 
extending direct-shipping privileges to out-of-state wineries—as 
opposed to revoking them from the in-state wineries.  
In the landmark case Granholm v. Heald,
22
 for example, the 
plaintiffs challenged a Michigan law that allowed in-state wineries to 
sell directly to Michiganders via the Internet, but prevented out-of-
state wineries from doing the same. The plaintiffs argued that this law 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-
of-state wineries. Prior to Granholm, it was unclear whether the 
Twenty-First Amendment, which gives states broad authority to 
                                                                                                                 
18 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 
495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Rotter & Joshua S. Stambaugh, What’s Left of the Twenty-First 
Amendment?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 601, 649 (2008) (―While the three-tier 
system is universally considered ‗unquestionably legitimate‘ to this day, that status may be 
vulnerable in light of the courts‘ increasing reluctance to leave state liquor regulatory systems 
untouched.‖); Tanford, supra note 11, at 330 (listing the unconstitutional effects of the three-tier 
system and concluding that ―Granholm suggests that its days may be numbered‖). 
20 Cagann, supra note 5, at 70. 
21 ―Between 2004 and 2006, contributions to state-level political campaigns from beer, 
wine, and spirits concerns totaled $21,362,727. The overwhelming majority of this money 
comes from distributors and wholesalers of alcohol. . . . Wholesalers and distributors have more 
to protect in terms of wealth . . . than any other industry, including producers.‖ Tom Wark, State 
of the States: Money, Wine & Politics, FERMENTATION: THE DAILY WINE BLOG (Mar. 31, 
2006), http://fermentation.typepad.com/fermentation/2006/03/state_of_the_st.html, cited in 
Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 645–46. 
22 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
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regulate alcohol, could ―save‖ a law like Michigan‘s that would 
otherwise be a clear violation of the dormant Commerce Clause‘s 
nondiscrimination principle. The Granholm Court made it clear that 
―straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local 
producers . . . [are] contrary to the Commerce Clause and [are] not 
saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.‖23  
In response to Granholm, at least nine states with similarly 
discriminatory laws on the books chose to extend direct-shipping 
privileges to out-of-state wineries; no state revoked existing direct-
shipping privileges completely.
24
 To that extent, the direct-shipping 
advocates‘ plan seems to have worked. But other states have tried to 
sidestep Granholm by passing ―interesting legislative devices‖25 that 
apparently are meant to favor local wineries without 
―straightforwardly‖ discriminating against out-of-state wineries. At 
first glance, these devices, which allow limited direct shipping, do not 
appear to discriminate because they are nominally available to all 
wineries. But their opponents argue that the devices contain such 
severe restrictions that in-state wineries are effectively the only 
beneficiaries. Examples of such devices include: production limits, 
case limits, face-to-face purchase requirements, prohibitive permit 
costs, and reciprocity requirements.
26
 Of these various restrictions, the 
production limit and the face-to-face purchase requirement are the 
most significant.
27
 In general, a face-to-face purchase requirement 
limits direct shipping by requiring consumers to make their purchases 
in person at the winery. A production limit restricts direct shipping by 
allowing only those wineries producing less than a specified amount 
of wine per year to ship directly to consumers.  
These types of laws tend to burden out-of-state wineries more than 
in-state wineries,
28
 but because the language of the law applies 
equally to in-state and out-of-state wineries, they do not fall neatly 
into the Granholm rubric. Nevertheless, direct-shipping advocates 
have brought a number of challenges to such laws in the wake of 
Granholm; they have been met with mixed success.
29
 This Note posits 
                                                                                                                 
23 Id. at 489. 
24 Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Gregory P. Luib, Moving Sideways: Post-Granholm 
Developments in Wine Direct Shipping and Their Implications for Competition, 75 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 505, 512–13 (2008). 
25 Cary S. Wiggins, Wine Online: A Sampling of What’s Happening with Online Wine 
Buying and Shipping, E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY, Sept. 2008, at 1, 9, available at 
http://www.technologybar.org/2009/02/wine-online/#fn-294-1. 
26 Id. at 9–10.  
27 Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 24, at 514. 
28 Id. at 506. 
29 Compare Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Massachusetts‘s production limit violated the dormant Commerce Clause), Cherry Hill 
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that this mixed success is the result of courts not applying the 
dormant Commerce Clause consistently. This Note further argues that 
the courts have been inconsistent not only because the proper 
application of the dormant Commerce Clause is unclear, but also 
because the dormant Commerce Clause is particularly difficult to 
apply to laws regulating the wine industry. The wine industry poses 
special problems not only because it implicates the Twenty-First 
Amendment, but also because it is bifurcated and geographically 
unbalanced.
30
 
Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the history of federal alcohol 
regulation in the United States through Granholm v. Heald. Part II 
lays out in general terms the various dormant Commerce Clause tests 
that courts use to analyze limited direct-shipping laws. Part III 
discusses how different courts have applied these tests to face-to-face 
                                                                                                                 
 
Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that Kentucky‘s in-person 
purchase requirement violated the Commerce Clause), Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Granholm, 596 
F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that Michigan‘s requirement that out-of-state 
retailers maintain an in-state location in order to ship directly to consumers violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause), Freeman v. Fischer, 563 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that New 
Jersey‘s provision allowing in-state wineries more salesrooms than out-of-state wineries 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause), and S. Wine & Spirits of Tex., Inc. v. Steen, 486 F. 
Supp. 2d 626 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that the facially discriminatory residency requirements 
imposed on out-of-state wine and liquor wholesalers was unconstitutional), with Black Star 
Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Arizona‘s in-person purchase 
requirement and production limit did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), Baude v. 
Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the wholesale clause in Indiana‘s alcohol law, 
which authorized some direct sales of wine, was unconstitutional, but that the face-to-face 
clause was constitutional), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009), Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. 
Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that Maine‘s in-person purchase requirement did 
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause), Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that Virginia‘s personal import exception did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause and that its policy of selling only in-state wines through its own stores was protected 
under the ―market participant‖ exception to the dormant Commerce Clause), Beau v. Moore, 
No. 4:05CV000903 SWW, 2007 WL 3231890 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2007) (dismissing on the 
pleadings plaintiffs‘ claim that four different provisions of Arkansas‘s alcoholic beverage law 
worked together to discriminate against out-of-state wineries in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause), Longstreet Delicatessen, Fine Wines & Specialty Coffees, L.L.C. v. Jolly, 
No. 1:06-CV-00986-OWW DLB, 2007 WL 2815022 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) (dismissing for 
lack of standing a suit challenging the constitutionality of California‘s reciprocity law and 
chartered flight provision), and Hurley v. Minner, No. CIV 05-826-SLR, 2006 WL 2789164 (D. 
Del. Sept. 26, 2006) (dismissing for failure to state a claim a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of Delaware‘s in-person purchase requirement). 
30 The industry is bifurcated because there are now, ―broadly speaking, two categories of 
wine[:] high-volume, lower-cost wines and low-volume, higher-quality, higher-priced boutique 
wines.‖ Family Winemakers of Cal., 592 F.3d at 6. The fact that the top eleven percent of U.S. 
wineries produce ninety-eight percent of U.S. wine illustrates the magnitude of this divide. 
Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112074, at 
*23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). It is also geographically 
unbalanced, because California accounts for over ninety percent of U.S. wine production. 
DONALD A. HODGEN, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. WINE INDUSTRY—2008, at 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.trade.gov/td/ocg/winereport_2009.pdf. 
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purchase requirements and suggests which of their approaches courts 
should adopt going forward. Part IV discusses how application of the 
tests has diverged in the context of production limits. The Digestif 
posits that the nonfungibility of wine might be used to bolster the 
argument that these post-Granholm cases portend: the three-tier 
system itself is unconstitutional. 
I. THE ROAD TO GRANHOLM 
A. Pre-Prohibition 
The Commerce Clause provides that ―Congress shall have 
Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.‖31 
These words reflect 
a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate 
reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the 
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would 
have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization 
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later 
among the States under the Articles of Confederation. The 
Commerce Clause has accordingly been interpreted by this 
Court not only as an authorization for congressional action, 
but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, 
as a restriction on permissible state regulation.
32
  
This implicit principle that the states may not interfere with interstate 
commerce is known as the ―negative,‖ or ―dormant,‖ Commerce 
Clause.
33
 
As the temperance movement gained strength during the 
nineteenth century, the dormant Commerce Clause became 
problematic for states wishing to go dry. If a state banned alcohol, 
residents could simply order some from a wet state.
34
 If the state then 
tried to ban the importation of alcohol, the Court would strike the law 
down under the dormant Commerce Clause.
35
 Essentially, it was 
                                                                                                                 
31 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
32 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1978) (citation omitted) (citing H.P. Hood 
& Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)). 
33 See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep‘t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 359 (1992) (―As we have long recognized, the ‗negative‘ or ‗dormant‘ aspect of the 
Commerce Clause prohibits States from ‗advanc[ing] their own commercial interests by 
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state.‖ (alteration in 
original) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 535)). 
34 Tanford, supra note 11, at 285. 
35 See, e.g., Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (holding that states did not 
have the power to restrict or prohibit the importation of alcohol without the explicit or implicit 
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impossible for a state to enforce its dry laws. Congress responded by 
enacting the Wilson Act
36
 in 1890, which allowed a state to regulate 
imported alcohol in the same way as its local alcohol.
37
 The Supreme 
Court, however, construed the Act narrowly, holding that it applied 
only to the resale of imported alcohol, not to the direct shipment of 
alcohol to the ultimate consumer.
38
 Therefore, a consumer could still 
circumvent his state‘s dry laws by having alcohol shipped directly to 
him from a wet state. To close this loophole, Congress enacted the 
Webb-Kenyon Act
39
 in 1913, allowing dry states to prevent their 
residents from evading local prohibition.
40
 The narrow scope of the 
Act is evident from its title, ―An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of 
their interstate character in certain cases.‖41 It is clear from the debate 
surrounding the passage of the Act, and the few Supreme Court cases 
interpreting it before national Prohibition began, that it was intended 
only to give effect to prohibition laws in dry states, not to allow for 
disparate treatment of local and imported alcohol in wet states.
42
 
B. The Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments 
National Prohibition began in January 1920, one year after thirty-
six states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment.
43
 When it came time to 
end the failed ―Noble Experiment,‖44 Congress drafted the Twenty-
First Amendment, which the states ratified in 1933. Section 1 of the 
Amendment repealed national Prohibition. Section 2 then added that 
                                                                                                                 
 
consent of Congress); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 285 (describing same). 
36 Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)). 
37 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 478 (2005). 
38 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 423 (1898) (holding that the words ―upon 
arrival‖ in the Wilson Act meant that a state could not regulate imported alcohol until after 
delivery had been completed); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 285–87 (discussing the 
Court‘s interpretation of the Wilson Act).  
39 Ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006)). 
40 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481–82 (discussing how the Supreme Court previously 
interpreted the Webb-Kenyon Act to extend the Wilson Act‘s authority to interstate shipments 
and close the direct-shipment gap). 
41 Tanford, supra note 11, at 288. 
42 See, e.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 323–24 (1917) 
(stating that the sole purpose of the Webb-Kenyon Act was to give effect to dry laws in states 
that had prohibition); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 287–89 (quoting statements made by 
several senators and representatives during debates in Congress and explaining the Supreme 
Court cases that held that the Act did not authorize discrimination against imported alcohol). 
43 See BORIS I. BITTKER WITH THE COLLABORATION OF BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER 
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 13.01, at 13-3 (1999). 
44 A term generally, though perhaps erroneously, attributed to Herbert Hoover. PAUL F. 
BOLLER, JR. & JOHN GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES, 
AND MISLEADING ATTRIBUTIONS 47–48 (1989); see, e.g., Tanford, supra note 11, at 289 n.103 
(attributing quotation to Herbert Hoover). 
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―[t]he transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited.‖45 This language is very similar to the Webb-
Kenyon Act, which provides: 
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any 
means whatsoever, of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, 
from one State . . . into any other State, . . . which 
said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person 
interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any 
manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in 
violation of any law of such State . . . is hereby prohibited.
46
 
The purpose of Section 2 is arguably the same as that of the Webb-
Kenyon Act—that is, to empower states to enforce their dry laws if 
they wish to continue local prohibition.
47
 Some evidence for this 
interpretation can be found in the statements of Senator Blaine, the 
Senate sponsor of the Amendment, who said during debate, ―So, to 
assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating 
liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently into the 
Constitution a prohibition along that line.‖48 But other evidence 
suggests that Section 2 was meant to grant states much broader power 
to regulate alcohol.
49
 In fact, Senator Blaine himself later said, ―The 
purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitutional 
amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce 
affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the confines of the 
States.‖50  
                                                                                                                 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
46 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2006); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1976) (―The 
wording of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson 
Acts . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). 
47 Tanford, supra note 11, at 291–95.  
48 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933); see also Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 608–09 
(discussing Blaine‘s statements). Part of the motivation for writing the Webb-Kenyon Act into 
the Constitution may have been that the constitutionality of the Act was somewhat in doubt. See 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 481 (2005) (―The constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act 
was in doubt.‖); see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 291 & n.108 (stating that the purpose of the 
Twenty-First Amendment was to write the Webb-Kenyon Act into the Constitution so that it 
could not be repealed by Congress). The Act was passed over President Taft‘s veto, Webb-
Kenyon Act, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699 (1913), and upheld by a divided Court in Clark Distilling 
Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).  
49 See Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 609–11 (discussing the argument that the 
text of the amendment and the Court‘s initial interpretation of it are evidence that a broad 
interpretation is correct). 
50 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933); see also Rotter & Stambaugh, supra note 19, at 609 
(discussing Senator Blaine‘s comments).  
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Given this murky legislative history, it is not surprising that the 
Amendment is open to a number of conflicting interpretations, which 
in turn have generated a large body of Supreme Court decisions. The 
Court‘s Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved 
significantly over the past seventy-seven years; many decisions in this 
area reflect the fundamental disagreement about the intent of the 
Amendment‘s framers.51  
C. The Court’s Shifting Twenty-First Amendment Jurisprudence 
Initially, the Court interpreted the Amendment broadly, as 
evidenced by its first major case on the subject, State Board of 
Equalization v. Young’s Market Co.52 The Court focused on the text 
of the Amendment rather than its legislative history,
53
 and Justice 
Brandeis famously announced: 
The words used [in Section 2 of the Amendment] are apt to 
confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations 
which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes. 
The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad command. They 
request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: 
The State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors 
provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its 
borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must 
let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal 
terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the 
Amendment, but a rewriting of it.
54
 
The Court‘s early Twenty-First Amendment cases, which followed in 
Young’s Market‘s footsteps, ―gave the Amendment such a broad 
reading that it looked like states could regulate, restrict, and burden 
interstate sales and deliveries of liquor in any way they wanted, 
‗unfettered by the Commerce Clause.‘‖55 States used the broad 
authority granted to them in the Court‘s early cases to enact laws that 
favored in-state producers and discriminated against out-of-state 
producers and importers.
56
  
                                                                                                                 
51 BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.02, at 13-5 to -6. 
52 299 U.S. 59 (1936). 
53 Tanford, supra note 11, at 296. 
54 Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. at 62; see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.03, at 13-7. 
55 Tanford, supra note 11, at 296–97 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 
308 U.S. 132, 138–39 (1939)). 
56 BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-14. 
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In time the Court began to retreat from its initial position and 
instead attempted to balance the Twenty-First Amendment against the 
dormant Commerce Clause.
57
 For example, in Hostetter v. Idlewild 
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
58
 the Court recognized that earlier cases 
such as Young’s Market had established broad state power over 
alcohol, but it qualified that power by reasoning that ―[t]o draw a 
conclusion from this line of decisions that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to ‗repeal‘ the Commerce Clause 
wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be 
an absurd oversimplification.‖59 
A major shift in the Court‘s jurisprudence came in the 1980s. In 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
60
 the Court finally took the opportunity 
to address the issue of discrimination, which it had left open in 
Young’s Market.61 In Bacchus, the Court struck down a Hawaiian law 
that exempted two local alcoholic beverages from the State‘s twenty-
percent excise tax on wholesale sales of liquor. The Court concluded 
that despite its doubts about the scope of, and intent behind, the 
Amendment, 
one thing is certain: The central purpose of [Section 2] was 
not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by 
erecting barriers to competition. It is also beyond doubt that 
the Commerce Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in 
preventing economic Balkanization. State laws that constitute 
mere economic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the 
same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils 
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor. Here, the State does not 
seek to justify its tax on the ground that it was designed to 
promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the 
purpose was ―to promote a local industry.‖ Consequently, 
because the tax violates a central tenet of the Commerce 
Clause but is not supported by any clear concern of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, we reject the State‘s belated claim 
based on the Amendment.
62
 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. at 13-14 to -15. The Court also began balancing the Amendment against other 
federal and constitutional principles such as the federal antitrust laws and the individual rights 
found in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 13-14. 
58 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
59 Id. at 331–32; see also Tanford, supra note 11, at 298 (discussing Idlewild). 
60 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
61 Tanford, supra note 11, at 298–99.  
62 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted); see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, 
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The Bacchus Court essentially adopted a balancing test to 
determine ―whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first 
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by [the challenged law] to 
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be 
offended.‖63 The Court pointed to its decision in Capital Cities Cable, 
Inc. v. Crisp
64
 for an alternative formulation of the test: ―whether the 
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the 
powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation 
may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict 
with express federal policies.‖65 This balancing test was dubbed the 
―core concerns‖ test.66 Given the ambiguity surrounding the original 
meaning of and intent behind the Twenty-First Amendment, 
identifying its core concerns was a somewhat dubious task. The 
Bacchus Court confirmed only that ―mere economic protectionism‖ is 
not one of them.
67
 But it was eventually settled that ―promoting 
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue‖ 
were the Twenty-First Amendment‘s core concerns.68 
Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia
69
 provides an 
example of how asserting a core concern can tip the balance in the 
state‘s favor, even ―in what would otherwise be a clear case of 
economic protectionism.‖70 In Kronheim, the District of Columbia 
had enacted a law that required alcoholic beverage licensees to store 
their entire inventory in the District. The District of Columbia Circuit 
found that even if the law were protectionist (and it acknowledged 
that Kronheim had made a credible argument that it was), the law was 
also motivated by the core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment. 
By requiring alcoholic beverages to be stored in the District, the law 
facilitated the monitoring of licensees‘ compliance with other alcohol 
beverage control laws and with tax laws. The fact that the law had 
mixed motives distinguished it from Bacchus; the Bacchus Court had 
                                                                                                                 
 
at 13-19 to -20 (discussing Bacchus). 
63 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275; see also Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v. 
Heald Mean for the Future of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier System, and Efficient 
Alcohol Distribution?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2006) (discussing the same 
Bacchus language). 
64 467 U.S. 691 (1984). 
65 Id. at 714; see also Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275–76 (quoting the Capital Cities test). 
66 See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the 
Bacchus test is ―commonly referred to as the ‗core concerns‘ test‖); see also Durkin, supra note 
63, at 1104 & n.42. 
67 Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276. 
68 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion); see also 
Durkin, supra note 63, at 1104 & n.44. 
69 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
70 BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-21. 
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found that the Hawaiian excise tax violated the Commerce Clause and 
was not supported by any core Twenty-First Amendment concern.
71
 
Accordingly, the Kronheim court concluded, ―[A]lthough the Act 
facially violates the negative commerce clause, it is supported by a 
clear concern for the core enforcement function of the Twenty-first 
Amendment‖ and is therefore constitutional.72 In other words, 
applying the core-concerns test gives a court the opportunity to 
―save‖ a discriminatory alcohol regulation by allowing the Twenty-
First Amendment to outweigh the dormant Commerce Clause. 
D. The First Shoe Drops 
But about a decade later, the balance shifted in favor of the 
dormant Commerce Clause when the Court announced its opinion in 
Granholm v. Heald. The consolidated cases in Granholm dealt with 
direct-shipping laws in Michigan and New York. Michigan allowed 
in-state wineries to ship wine directly to in-state customers; out-of-
state wineries were not allowed to apply for this type of license. New 
York allowed wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes 
to ship directly to in-state customers; other wineries (i.e., out-of-state 
wineries) could do so only if they first established a presence (a 
factory, office, or storeroom) in New York.
73
 In both cases, the 
plaintiffs were in-state consumers and out-of-state ―small wineries 
that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their 
businesses.‖74  
Before beginning its analysis of the challenged exceptions to the 
three-tier system, the Court reaffirmed that ―the three-tier system 
itself is ‗unquestionably legitimate.‘‖75 The Court, however, offered 
no explanation of why the system is still legitimate. Perhaps it 
believed that its choice of adverb obviated any need to so do. The 
Court did, however, explain why these particular exceptions were not 
legitimate. Interestingly, the Court characterized Michigan and New 
York‘s alcohol regulatory schemes not as general three-tier systems 
with exceptions for in-state wineries, but as limited three-tier systems 
that applied only to out-of-state wineries.
76
 Either way one looks at it, 
the Court‘s conclusion is accurate: ―The differential treatment 
                                                                                                                 
71 Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 203–04; see also BITTKER, supra note 43, § 13.04, at 13-21. 
72 Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 204. 
73 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2005). 
74 Id. at 468. 
75 Id. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality 
opinion)). 
76 Id. at 465–67. 
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between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes explicit 
discrimination against interstate commerce.‖77  
The Court was able to reach this conclusion by holding that ―the 
Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the 
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that States 
may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.‖78 
With regard to direct shipping in particular, the Court held, ―If a State 
chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on 
evenhanded terms‖ because the Twenty-First Amendment ―does not 
allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-
state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-
state producers.‖79 The Court concluded that both States‘ laws, ―by 
their own terms,‖ violated the Commerce Clause‘s proscription 
against discriminating against interstate commerce.
80
 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas noted that this holding is strange 
because although ―[t]he Court place[d] much weight upon the 
authority of Bacchus . . . [it did] not even mention, let alone apply, the 
‗core concerns‘ test that Bacchus established. The Court instead sub 
silentio cast[] aside that test, employing otherwise-applicable negative 
Commerce Clause scrutiny and giving no weight to the Twenty-first 
Amendment.‖81 Therefore, by clarifying that the Twenty-First 
Amendment cannot save a discriminatory state law, Granholm 
created a new question: whether the core-concerns test has any 
remaining validity. Moreover, the Granholm Court did not clarify 
how lower courts should determine discrimination in less clear-cut 
cases. This dual uncertainty makes it difficult to analyze the 
―interesting legislative devices‖ that have been enacted since 
Granholm. These new limitations on direct shipping do burden 
interstate commerce, but they do not discriminate ―by their own 
terms,‖ like the laws at issue in Granholm. It is also unclear how 
much weight to give the States‘ arguments that these limitations 
promote core Twenty-First Amendment concerns.
82
 
                                                                                                                 
77 Id. at 467. 
78 Id. at 486. 
79 Id. at 493. 
80 Id. at 476. 
81 Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
82 For example, States have argued that face-to-face purchase requirements help limit 
minors‘ access to alcohol. See, e.g., Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009). 
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II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
When analyzing a law that has been challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, a court must first choose which level of scrutiny 
to apply. Laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are 
subject to heightened scrutiny. Laws that burden interstate commerce, 
but do not rise to the level of being discriminatory, are analyzed under 
the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
83
 This 
threshold question of discrimination is often outcome determinative 
because the heightened-scrutiny test contains a strong presumption of 
invalidity, whereas the Pike balancing test is much more lenient.
84
 
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the law 
discriminates against interstate commerce. ―‗[D]iscrimination‘ simply 
means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.‖85 There are 
potentially three ways to prove discrimination. First, a law may be 
facially discriminatory. If the language of the statute itself 
distinguishes between in-state and out-of-state entities, then the law is 
discriminatory on its face.
86
 Second, a law may be discriminatory in 
effect. Even if the statute appears to treat all entities the same way, 
i.e., it is facially neutral, it may in reality still discriminate in favor of 
in-state entities.
87
 Third, a law may be discriminatory in purpose. The 
test for determining whether the legislature passed the law for a 
discriminatory purpose is not entirely clear; it is also unclear whether 
a finding of discriminatory purpose, on its own, is sufficient to trigger 
heightened scrutiny.
88
 In any case, once the plaintiff establishes that 
the law is discriminatory, the burden shifts to the State to prove that 
the law ―advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.‖89 
                                                                                                                 
83 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
84 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 430–31 (3d 
ed. 2006); Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 24, at 524–28. 
85 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
86 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 431. For example, the Michigan law at issue in 
Granholm was facially discriminatory because it provided that in-state wineries could ship 
directly but that out-of-state wineries could not. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005). 
87 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 433. The criteria for determining discriminatory effect 
are not exactly clear and will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV. 
88 See infra Part IV.A.1.  
89 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 463 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 
278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Granholm Court did not actually use the 
words ―heightened scrutiny‖ but several circuit cases do describe this test as the heightened-
scrutiny test. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st 
Cir. 2007). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court once referred to this test as ―strict scrutiny.‖ See 
Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 94. This has caused some confusion among lower courts. See, 
e.g., infra note 119 and accompanying text.  
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This opportunity to defend the law is all but illusory because 
discriminatory laws ―face ‗a virtually per se rule of invalidity.‘‖90 
If the law is not discriminatory, then the plaintiff must prove that 
the law‘s burdens clearly outweigh its benefits in order for the court 
to declare it unconstitutional. Or, as the Pike Court put it, ―Where the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.‖91  
Two interesting features of this formulation make the Pike test 
difficult to apply. First, the test requires the court to balance the 
burdens on all of interstate commerce against the benefits to a single 
state. The two sides of the balance seem to be measuring very 
different things; consequently, there are no set standards for how the 
court should make this comparison.
92
 The only guidance provided by 
the Pike Court is, ―[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and 
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities.‖93 Second, although the State must show a 
significant local benefit in order to win the balancing test, if the 
benefit is too great, it might appear that the State passed the law for a 
discriminatory purpose. This makes the Pike test a bit paradoxical.
94
 
Moreover, because Granholm left the core-concerns test up in the air, 
there is a possibility that the Twenty-First Amendment is still relevant 
to Pike analysis. Granholm held that the Twenty-First Amendment 
cannot save a discriminatory law; it did not explain how the Twenty-
First Amendment affects a nondiscriminatory alcohol regulation that 
is at risk of failing the Pike test.
95
  
III. FACE-TO-FACE PURCHASE REQUIREMENTS 
The courts that have addressed the constitutionality of face-to-face 
purchase requirements have treated them quite differently. Sections A 
through C discuss three recent cases in this area: Baude v. Heath,
96
 
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly,
97
 and Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC 
                                                                                                                 
90 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
624 (1978)). 
91 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
92 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 84, at 437. 
93 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
94 See BITTKER, supra note 43, § 6.06, at 6-34. 
95 See Durkin, supra note 63, at 1108–10. 
96 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 (2009). 
97 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 12/30/2010 9:21:44 PM 
2010] THE LEGACY OF GRANHOLM V. HEALD 325 
v. Baldacci.
98
 Section D proposes a mode of analysis for future face-
to-face requirement challenges. The main question appears to be 
where to draw the line between an incidental burden and a 
discriminatory effect. And within that issue lies a secondary question 
of how to deal with the difference between state borders and 
geographic distance. Interestingly, two of these courts also considered 
the nonfungibility of wine, but came to different conclusions about its 
implications; Section D addresses this issue as well. 
A. Baude v. Heath 
In Baude v. Heath, the plaintiffs challenged certain restrictions on 
the direct-shipping exception to Indiana‘s three-tier system. One of 
the challenged restrictions was the face-to-face purchase requirement, 
which ―requires any consumer who wants to receive direct shipments 
of wine—from any winery, in or out of Indiana—to visit the winery 
once and supply proof of name, age, address, and phone number, plus 
a verified statement that the wine is intended for personal 
consumption.‖99 The parties sparred over which standard should 
govern the court‘s analysis—heightened scrutiny or the Pike 
balancing test.
100
 The district court noted, ―[T]here is ‗no clear line 
separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se 
invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the 
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach.‘‖101 The Seventh Circuit 
has characterized the difference between a law that is discriminatory 
in effect and a law that burdens interstate commerce incidentally as a 
difference of degree.
102
  
The district court in Baude concluded that the face-to-face 
requirement was discriminatory in effect. It reasoned that the degree 
of the burden imposed depends on how far the winery is from Indiana 
and that, ―as the parties know, the overwhelming number of out-of-
state [wineries] are not located close to Indiana‘s borders. They are 
hundreds of miles away. . . . [Therefore, i]n practical effect, the 
statute discriminates far more heavily against out-of-state 
wineries.‖103 The district court further held that although Indiana had 
                                                                                                                 
98 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007). 
99 Baude, 538 F.3d at 612. 
100 Baude v. Heath, No. 1:05-cv-0735-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2479587, at *12–13 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2382 (2009). 
101 Id. at *13 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986)). 
102 Id. (citing Nat‘l Paint & Coatings Ass‘n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th 
Cir. 1995)). 
103 Id. at *22. 
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a legitimate interest in curbing underage drinking, it failed to prove 
that there were no less discriminatory means available.
104
 The 
plaintiffs had offered two alternatives: requiring the common carrier 
to verify the recipient‘s age upon delivery, or requiring wineries to 
use a third-party age verification service.
105
  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit decided that the Pike test was the 
proper standard to apply. Chief Judge Easterbrook wrote that the rule 
of per se invalidity applies to laws that are discriminatory on their 
face, and that the provisions challenged in this case were not facially 
discriminatory. He did not, however, explicitly say that laws that are 
discriminatory in effect do not merit heightened scrutiny. Instead, he 
rephrased the district court‘s finding to eliminate the word 
discrimination, thus making it appear that the Pike balancing test was 
the appropriate test. Specifically, he said that the district court had 
concluded that the challenged laws ―impose higher costs on interstate 
commerce.‖106  
Forced to use the Pike framework, the plaintiffs-appellees argued 
that the burdens of the face-to-face requirement outweigh its benefits. 
The law burdens interstate commerce because the farther away the 
winery is, the more expensive it becomes for the customer to make 
the visit; the law‘s benefit (curbing underage consumers‘ access to 
wine) is minimal because underage people can find a way to obtain 
wine no matter what the law provides.
107
  
Without addressing the district court‘s observation that the vast 
majority of out-of-state wineries are located on the West Coast, the 
Seventh Circuit emphasized that many Indianans live closer to 
Michigan or Illinois wineries than to in-state wineries. Chief Judge 
Easterbrook also hypothesized that an oenophile could take one 
vacation to Napa and sign up for direct shipping at a multitude of 
wineries, making the cost per winery quite small. Because not as 
many people vacation in Indiana wine country, and because Indiana‘s 
wineries are much more spread out than Napa‘s, it could actually be 
more costly for a non-Indianan oenophile to sign up at an equivalent 
number of Indiana wineries. He concluded, 
                                                                                                                 
104 The test is actually whether any ―reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives‖ exist. 
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 
U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court may have gotten 
this confused with the Pike inquiry, which is whether the purpose could be accomplished with a 
―lesser impact‖ on interstate commerce. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
105 Baude, 2007 WL 2479587, at *24. 
106 Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 
(2009). 
107 Id. at 612–14. 
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[A]lthough it may be more costly for a person living in 
Indianapolis to satisfy the face-to-face requirement at five 
Oregon wineries than at five Indiana wineries, it is not 
necessarily substantially more expensive (per winery) to sign 
up at a larger number of west-coast wineries than at an 
equivalent number of Indiana wine producers.
108
 
As for the law‘s minimal benefits, the plaintiffs argued that the 
two alternative age-verification methods they had proposed in the 
district court were just as effective as a face-to-face verification. They 
also argued that studies have shown that face-to-face age verification 
is actually ineffective. The court gave little weight to these arguments 
and their supporting evidence. It also reasoned that the fact that 
underage people will try to get around the law does not imply that 
there is no point in having the law in the first place. ―The face-to-face 
requirement makes it harder for minors to get wine. Anything that 
raises the cost of an activity will diminish the quantity—not to zero, 
but no law is or need be fully effective.‖109 
Baude illustrates why the level of scrutiny applied is so important. 
By finding that the law was not discriminatory, the Seventh Circuit 
forced the plaintiffs to argue that the cost of visiting a winery clearly 
outweighs the benefit of restricting minors‘ access to alcohol; it also 
saved the State from having to argue that the less costly age-
verification alternatives are unreasonable. 
B. Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly 
Kentucky‘s face-to-face purchase requirement, at issue in Cherry 
Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, differed from Indiana‘s requirement in 
that it required the customer to make each purchase in person, not just 
the initial purchase.
110
 The plaintiffs argued that the law was 
discriminatory in effect. Out-of-state wineries are burdened because 
the law drives up the cost of their wines; they must either incur extra 
costs by selling through a Kentucky wholesaler or wait for Kentucky 
customers to travel thousands of miles to their wineries to make 
purchases. And wineries that cannot secure wholesaler representation 
are completely shut out of the Kentucky market unless the Kentucky 
customers come to them. Even if a winery has an established 
relationship with a customer and has verified his age and address, the 
customer must still come to the winery each time he wants to place an 
                                                                                                                 
108 Id. at 613. 
109 Id. at 614. 
110 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 427–28, 433 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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order.
111
 Both Kentucky wineries and Kentucky wholesalers benefit 
from the law. Small Kentucky wineries benefit from less competition 
from out-of-state wineries, especially wineries that are very far away 
and whose wines are preferred by consumers. Wholesalers benefit 
because the law limits the extent to which wineries can bypass the 
wholesale tier; ―the statute guarantees the Wholesalers a source of 
revenue that would not exist but for the statute.‖112 
In the district court, Kentucky had argued that the requirement‘s 
effect on interstate commerce was incidental because Kentucky has 
seven border states and some Kentuckians are closer to those out-of-
state wineries than to Kentucky wineries.
113
 The plaintiffs made three 
counterpoints. First, they argued that the State‘s observation ignored 
the fact that there are wineries outside of Kentucky and its border 
states. Second, wine is a unique product. Third, many of the desirable 
wines come from the West Coast, not from Kentucky‘s border 
states.
114
 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the State was 
not looking at ―interstate economic interests as a whole.‖115 Kentucky 
and its border states account for only 0.6% of the nation‘s total wine 
production.
116
 The court said,  
We note that wine is a unique product. Accordingly, we agree 
with the plaintiffs that ―it is false to presume that a wine 
consumer would purchase from the closest winery all things 
being equal.‖ Thus, the defendants‘ argument is flawed. We 
are convinced that the effect on interstate commerce is not de 
minimis.
117
 
After the court found that the requirement was discriminatory in 
effect, the State argued that the requirement should still be upheld 
because it furthered the legitimate purposes of promoting temperance, 
curbing underage drinking, and maintaining tax revenue.
118
 But the 
district court held that the requirement was not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to achieving those goals.
119
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
111 Id. at 432–33. 
112 Id. at 433. 
113 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 (W.D. Ky. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008). The named 
state defendant changed when the case went up on appeal because the Kentucky Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control changed executive directors during that time period. Lilly, 553 F.3d 
at 426 n.1. 
114 Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 616–17. 
115 Id. at 616 (emphasis added). 
116 Id. at 617. 
117 Id. (citations omitted). 
118 Id. at 618–22. 
119 Id. at 622. Determining whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose is 
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affirmed the district court‘s findings that the requirement was 
discriminatory in effect and unconstitutional.
120
 
The district court‘s finding of discriminatory effect seems to rest 
on its observation that most out-of-state wineries are located on the 
West Coast, not in the states that border Kentucky. This means that it 
is generally much more costly for a Kentuckian to visit an out-of-state 
winery than an in-state winery. This added cost is a burden on 
Kentucky wine consumers as well as on interstate commerce. These 
same arguments also apply to Indiana‘s face-to-face requirement. The 
reason Kentucky‘s requirement was struck down while Indiana‘s was 
not is probably that the Kentucky requirement applied to every 
purchase, not just the initial purchase. Over the long term, Kentucky‘s 
requirement is much more burdensome than Indiana‘s. 
C. Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci 
In Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, the plaintiffs challenged 
an exception to Maine‘s three-tier system that allows small wineries 
(―farm wineries‖ in the statute) to sell directly to consumers, provided 
that it is a face-to-face sale at the winery, or at one of up to two off-
site locations established by the winery.
121
 The plaintiffs argued that 
the requirement is discriminatory in effect because it raises the cost of 
West Coast wines as compared with Maine wines.
122
  
The court noted that the Supreme Court has never explicitly said 
what showing is required to prove discriminatory effect. The First 
Circuit decided, ―[T]hat showing must be substantial.‖123 
Consequently, it made short work of the plaintiffs‘ arguments.  
[T]he plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that permitting 
farm wineries to sell only face to face, either on premises or 
at approved in-state locations, discriminates against interstate 
commerce. There is no evidence that Maine law acts to 
protect Maine vineyards or that Maine consumers substitute 
                                                                                                                 
 
not the proper test. The proper test is whether there are reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives that could achieve the same purpose. The district court did refer to the correct test, 
but it mistakenly labeled the test as the ―strict scrutiny‖ test. See id. at 617–18. It may have 
made this mistake because the Court once referred to this test as ―strict scrutiny.‖ See Or. Waste 
Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 94 (1994). The actual strict scrutiny test is 
used in the Equal Protection setting; it requires that a law be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 714 (2007); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
120 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2008). 
121 Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2007). 
122 Id. at 31–34 & n.2. 
123 Id. at 36. 
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wine purchased directly from Maine vineyards for wines that 
they otherwise would have purchased from out-of-state 
producers. There is not even evidence that any wines at all 
are purchased by consumers directly from Maine vineyards. 
And, finally, nothing contained in the stipulated record 
suggests that the locus option somehow alters the competitive 
balance between in-state and out-of-state firms. 
The substitution scenario is further weakened by the fact that 
the plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that would in any 
way undermine the plausible impression that Maine 
consumers (like imbibers everywhere) view trips to a winery 
as a distinct experience incommensurate with—and, 
therefore, unlikely to be replaced by—a trip to either a 
mailbox or a retail liquor store. Nor have they offered 
evidence to impeach the suggestion, made in one of the cases 
on which they rely, that bottles of wine are unique and, thus, 
unlikely to be perceived by consumers as interchangeable.
124
 
The plaintiffs responded by arguing ―that even if ‗the impact is 
small because direct sales do not constitute a significant market 
and . . . in-state wineries do not do much walk-in business,‘ the 
regime is nonetheless unconstitutional because the dormant 
commerce clause contains no de minimis exception.‖125 The plaintiffs 
relied on Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison
126
 for 
this proposition. In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that under 
the Commerce Clause, there is no de minimis defense to a finding of 
discriminatory taxation.
127
 The First Circuit found that the case was 
not on point because it dealt with a law that was discriminatory on its 
face, as opposed to being discriminatory in effect.
128
 The First Circuit 
reasoned,  
[T]he plaintiffs cannot succeed in this case merely by 
invoking the de minimis standard and ignoring their burden to 
proffer substantial evidence of discrimination. . . . Were we to 
require no showing beyond the de minimis level, no 
                                                                                                                 
124 Id. at 36–37 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple 
Adver. Comm‘n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977); Jelovsek v. Bresden, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021 
(E.D. Tenn. 2007)). 
125 Id. at 38 (omission in original) (quoting Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, 2007 
U.S. 1st Cir. Briefs LEXIS 44, at *10). 
126 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
127 Id. at 581 n.15. 
128 Baldacci, 505 F.3d at 38. 
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distinction would exist between the discriminatory effect test 
and the incidental burden test . . . in Pike.
129
  
The court decided that the plaintiffs‘ main complaint was about the 
effects of geography, and concluded, ―An effect is not 
discriminatory . . . if it results from natural conditions.‖130 The court 
also reasoned, ―Given Maine‘s large land mass and the concentration 
of its population in the southern end of the state, it cannot plausibly 
be said that the farm winery exception redounds to the exclusive 
benefit of Maine vineyards.‖131 After finding that the requirement is 
not discriminatory in effect, the court did not analyze the requirement 
under the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs had made a ―rifle-
shot appeal,‖ arguing only discriminatory effect.132 
The Baldacci court apparently chose to formalize the distinction 
between an incidental burden and a discriminatory effect by imposing 
a higher burden of proof—substantial showing—on plaintiffs who 
argue discriminatory effect. The Baldacci court also declined to 
recognize that the U.S. wine industry is geographically unbalanced—
that is, most out-of-state wineries are not located anywhere near the 
southern end of Maine. But even if the court had recognized that the 
face-to-face requirement raises the cost of West Coast wine in 
comparison to Maine wine, this fact alone probably would not have 
been sufficient. Instead, the First Circuit wanted evidence that Maine 
wineries have actually benefitted from this law to the detriment of 
out-of-state wineries—that Mainers have actually visited in-state 
wineries to purchase wine and that such purchases replaced potential 
purchases of out-of-state wine. The court gave two reasons why such 
a result is unlikely. First, visiting a winery is recreational and will 
therefore not replace a Mainer‘s regular alcohol purchasing habits.133 
And second, because wines are unique, a Mainer will not replace an 
out-of-state wine with a Maine wine just because it is cheaper to visit 
the Maine winery.
134
 
D. Proposed Analysis of Face-to-Face Purchase Requirements 
First, courts should not place a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs 
who argue discriminatory effect. The Baldacci court decided that the 
                                                                                                                 
129 Id. at 38–39. 
130 Id. at 37 n.7. 
131 Id. at 37–38 (citation omitted) (citing Grant‘s Dairy—Me., LLC v. Comm‘r of Me. 
Dep‘t of Agric., Food & Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
132 Id. at 33. 
133 Id. at 37. 
134 Id. 
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plaintiffs‘ showing must be substantial, but that is illogical.135 Instead 
of requiring a substantial showing of discriminatory effect, courts 
should require a showing of a substantial burden on interstate 
commerce. When phrased in this way, the requirement echoes the 
Seventh Circuit‘s observation that the difference between an 
incidental burden and a discriminatory effect is one of degree. 
―Substantial burden‖ is simply the name for the point at which a law‘s 
incidental effects on interstate commerce become discriminatory. 
This proposed formulation is meant only to clarify the framework; it 
should not actually affect a court‘s analysis. Deciding whether a law 
is discriminatory in effect or places only incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce remains a fact-sensitive balancing task. The 
complement to this proposal is that a de minimis burden on interstate 
commerce should not trigger a finding of discriminatory effect. A de 
minimis burden is analogous to an incidental burden,
136
 which the 
Court has established is not discriminatory.
137
  
If a court does find that the burden on interstate commerce is 
sufficient to establish that the law is discriminatory in effect, then the 
court should apply heightened scrutiny. Baude implied that 
heightened scrutiny is reserved for laws that are facially 
discriminatory. The Seventh Circuit may have been relying on the 
Supreme Court‘s statement, ―State laws discriminating against 
interstate commerce on their face are ‗virtually per se invalid.‘‖138 
But the Court has also said the rule of per se invalidity applies ―where 
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation.‖139 
And in Bacchus the Court said, ―A finding that state legislation 
constitutes ‗economic protectionism‘ may be made on the basis of 
                                                                                                                 
135 Although the Baldacci court did not explain why it decided to require a substantial 
showing, Professor David Day offers one possible explanation: a finding of discriminatory 
effect requires a higher degree of judicial intervention because the court must review empirical 
evidence, which is frequently disputed. David S. Day, The Expanded Concept of Facial 
Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 497, 513 
(2007). But for those who dislike this high degree of judicial intervention, the solution is 
apparently to reject the theory of discriminatory effect altogether—not to require a higher 
degree of proof. See id. (explaining that Justices Scalia and Thomas have rejected the 
discrimination-in-effect theory largely because it depends on heightened judicial intervention).  
136 De minimis means ―[t]rifling,‖ ―minimal,‖ or something ―so insignificant that a court 
may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009). 
Incidental means ―[s]ubordinate to something of greater importance; having a minor role.‖ Id. at 
830. 
137 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (―[W]e must 
inquire . . . whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only ‗incidental‘ effects 
on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.‖). 
138 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996) (first emphasis added) (quoting Or. 
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
139 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
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either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect.‖140 Therefore, 
it appears that heightened scrutiny should apply if a law is 
discriminatory on its face, in its purpose, or in effect. The Granholm 
Court accordingly generalized the rule, declaring: ―State laws that 
discriminate against interstate commerce face ‗a virtually per se rule 
of invalidity.‘‖141 Although the Court has not been crystal clear on 
this point, this Note argues that heightened scrutiny should apply to 
laws with discriminatory effects because they are just as harmful to 
interstate commerce as facially discriminatory laws.  
The trickier question is how to determine when a law‘s burdens on 
interstate commerce rise to the level of being discriminatory in effect. 
More specifically, the issue is whether face-to-face purchase 
requirements place only an incidental or a de minimis burden on 
interstate commerce or whether the burden is substantial enough to 
rise to the level of discrimination. In making that determination, the 
First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits seemed to struggle with the 
relevance of the wine industry‘s geographic imbalance and the 
nonfungible nature of wine.  
Courts should not ignore the wine industry‘s geographic 
imbalance; the reality is that the majority of U.S. wineries are located 
on the West Coast.
142
 It is true that ―[t]he costs of a face-to-face 
meeting depend on distance, not on borders,‖143 and that ―[d]istance is 
not congruent with state lines.‖144 But for Indianans, Kentuckians and 
Mainers, the large distance between them and sixty percent of U.S. 
wineries is congruent with those wineries being out-of-state. As a 
result of their distance from the West Coast, it is much more costly 
for residents of these states to purchase a wine in person at most out-
of-state wineries than at an in-state winery.  
The difference is even starker when one realizes that those West 
Coast wineries produce ninety-three percent of U.S. wine.
145
 This 
effect should be considered discriminatory. Hunt v. Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission
146
 established that laws that raise the 
cost of doing business for out-of-state producers while leaving in-
                                                                                                                 
140 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (citations omitted). 
141 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 
at 624). 
142 As of 2010, almost sixty percent of U.S. wineries were located in California, Oregon, or 
Washington. Growth of the U.S. Wine Industry, WINEAMERICA, http://www.wineamerica.org/ 
newsroom/wine%20data%20center/2010-Growth-of-US-Wine-Industry.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 
2010).  
143 Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2382 
(2009). 
144 Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 37 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007). 
145 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1. 
146 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
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state producers unaffected are discriminatory in effect.
147
 One might 
argue that this rule does not apply in this situation as the state has not 
raised the cost of doing business for any winery, but has instead 
created a new direct-shipping market, which is available to both in-
state and out-of-state wineries. But by restricting this new direct-
shipping market with a face-to-face purchase requirement, the state 
ensures that only in-state wineries will have any real chance of doing 
business in this new market. The requirement generally makes it too 
time consuming and expensive to buy directly from most out-of-state 
wineries. The Hunt rule that it is discriminatory to alter an existing 
market to make out-of-state goods more costly should be extended to 
forbid states from creating new markets that do the same thing.  
One might argue that the consumer still has the option of 
purchasing out-of-state wine at an in-state retailer instead of traveling 
to the winery himself. The wholesale and retail markups will not cost 
nearly as much as flying out to the West Coast. Thus, the burden on 
interstate commerce is de minimis.  
But this reasoning ignores the fact that of the 25,000 wines 
produced in the United States, only about 500 make it to retail 
shelves.
148
 If the customer happens to want one of the other 24,500 
wines, he must travel to the winery to buy it in person. And as 
discussed above, the out-of-state wines in that group of 24,500 will 
cost a lot more to obtain than the in-state ones. Therefore when one 
considers the geographic imbalance of the wine industry, most states‘ 
face-to-face purchase requirements are discriminatory in effect—at 
least with respect to the group of wineries that do not have stable 
national distribution networks.  
In a state that borders California, however, it may not cost 
significantly more to visit the majority of out-of-state wineries; 
therefore, the burden on interstate commerce may be only incidental. 
Of California‘s border states, only Arizona has a face-to-face 
purchase requirement.
149
 The Ninth Circuit recently held that 
Arizona‘s face-to-face purchase requirement is not discriminatory in 
effect without relying on the fact that Arizonans live relatively close 
to most out-of-state wineries.
150
  
                                                                                                                 
147 Id. at 350–51. 
148 Tanford, supra note 11, at 303. 
149 See State Shipping Laws: Arizona, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant. 
com/StateDetail.aspx?StateId=31 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (summarizing Arizona wine 
shipment laws).  
150 See Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (reading 
Granholm as prohibiting only facially discriminatory direct-shipping laws). Because Arizona‘s 
face-to-face purchase requirement applies to both in-state and out-of-state wineries, it is not 
facially discriminatory and therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, not unconstitutional. Id.  
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It is less clear how courts should treat the argument that wine is 
not fungible. In Lilly, Kentucky argued that the law‘s effects on 
interstate commerce were incidental. It explained that many 
Kentuckians live closer to out-of-state wineries located in Kentucky‘s 
border states than to in-state wineries. For them, it will actually be 
cheaper to visit the out-of-state winery than the in-state winery. In 
response, the plaintiffs pointed to both the wine industry‘s geographic 
imbalance and wine‘s nonfungibility. The geography argument is that 
most wines come from the West Coast, not Kentucky‘s border states. 
Therefore, for all Kentuckians, most out-of-state wines are going to 
be much more expensive than in-state wines. The nonfungibility 
argument is that although some Kentuckians may be closer to out-of-
state wineries than in-state wineries, those are not the wineries they 
are buying from; most Kentuckians want to buy specific wines from 
the West Coast. The law punishes them for preferring West Coast 
wines by raising the cost of those wines. The plaintiffs‘ dual 
argument is that most out-of-state wines, and the wines Kentuckians 
are actually buying, are much more costly as a result of this law. 
The district court responded to this argument by noting, ―[W]ine is 
a unique product. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs that ‗it is 
false to presume that a wine consumer would purchase from the 
closest winery all things being equal‘‖; therefore, ―the defendants‘ 
argument is flawed.‖151 Essentially, the court recognized that the law 
does not make some out-of-state wines cheaper because no one is 
buying those wines; they are buying the wines from California. And 
because the law has the effect of raising the price of those wines, it is 
discriminatory in effect.  
It is good that the District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky took into account the reality of which wines Kentuckians 
are actually buying. To the extent that the nonfungibility argument 
helps highlight that reality, it is beneficial. But even without this fact, 
the district court probably still would have found the law to be 
discriminatory in effect because it raises the cost of so many out-of-
state wines. 
Interestingly, the Baldacci court used the nonfungibility of wine 
argument against the plaintiffs. It reasoned that if a customer really 
wants a particular out-of-state wine, he will not purchase an in-state 
wine just because it is cheaper. The court implied that a law cannot 
have a discriminatory effect if it does not actually change people‘s 
                                                                                                                 
151 Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 488 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (W.D. Ky. 2006) 
(quoting Plaintiff‘s Response to Defendants‘ Supplemental Brief at 7), aff’d sub nom. Cherry 
Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, 553 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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behavior.
152
 But this conclusion ignores the fact that the law 
essentially punishes its residents for preferring out-of-state wines by 
making those wines more costly than their in-state counterparts. 
Moreover, in some situations, the law will induce customers to 
change their behavior. For example, if the particular out-of-state wine 
that the customer wants is not available at retail, and if he does not 
have the time or money to fly to the winery to purchase it, then he 
probably will substitute it with a wine that he can buy at home—
either at a nearby in-state winery or at a retailer. Even if he goes to 
the retailer and buys another out-of-state wine, an in-state wholesaler 
and an in-state retailer have profited from that transaction and the out-
of-state winery that he wanted to buy from has lost a sale.  
This raises the question of whether a court may compare out-of-
state wineries to in-state wholesalers and retailers when determining 
discriminatory effect. One might argue that shifting business from 
out-of-state wineries to in-state wholesalers is not discriminatory 
because ―discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially 
similar entities.‖153 But Professor James Tanford has argued that some 
laws, while not technically discriminatory, may still violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause under the theory of economic 
protectionism.  
Although the Court occasionally uses economic 
protectionism and discrimination interchangeably, the two 
concepts are slightly different. . . . [A] law that disadvantages 
an out-of-state business for the benefit of an in-state business 
of a different type (e.g., out-of-state wineries vs. in-state 
wholesalers) is not discriminatory, because the two 
businesses are not similarly situated, but it is still 
protectionist.
 154
 
Such a law works to ―protect local industry by erecting barriers to 
interstate competition.‖155 And the Supreme Court has noted, 
―Preservation of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of 
                                                                                                                 
152 The Baldacci court also implied that people will not replace their regular trip to the 
local liquor store with a trip to a winery because trips to wineries are primarily recreational. 
People go to a winery to talk to the winemaker and visit the tasting room, not to do their grocery 
shopping. But this argument fails to recognize that for the 24,500 wines not available at retail, 
the face-to-face purchase requirement gives the customer only two options: either visit the 
winery or don‘t buy the wine. 
153 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997) (footnote omitted) (holding in 
part that the State‘s differential treatment of public utilities companies and independent 
marketers did not violate the Commerce Clause). 
154 Tanford, supra note 11, at 282–83. 
155 Id. at 282. 
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interstate competition is the hallmark of the economic protectionism 
that the Commerce Clause prohibits.‖156 But even if courts do not 
accept Tanford‘s economic-protectionism argument, they should still 
find face-to-face purchase requirements to be discriminatory in most 
states for the reasons discussed above. The Baldacci court did not 
accept the discriminatory-effect argument because it was looking for 
evidence that the law changed people‘s purchasing habits. It seemed 
to ignore the fact that under Hunt, a law can be discriminatory in 
effect merely by raising the cost of the out-of-state product. 
IV. PRODUCTION LIMITS 
Two recent cases examined the validity of production limits under 
the dormant Commerce Clause: Family Winemakers of California v. 
Jenkins
157
 and Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver.
158
 These opinions 
raise a number of questions regarding how to prove a discriminatory 
purpose, a discriminatory effect, or a Pike undue burden. The fact that 
the wine industry is bifurcated (which makes it top heavy) 
complicates courts‘ analyses because it is unclear whether, in 
determining discriminatory effect, the courts should look at the 
amount of wine excluded or the number of wineries excluded by the 
production limit. Sections A and B discuss Family Winemakers and 
Black Star Farms respectively. Section C proposes which approach 
courts should apply to production-limit challenges going forward.  
A. Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins 
In Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, the plaintiffs 
challenged Massachusetts‘s production limit. Prior to 2005, 
Massachusetts had a facially discriminatory exception to its three-tier 
system that allowed only in-state wineries to sell directly to retailers 
and consumers.
159
 Shortly after Granholm was decided, the District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts held this law to be 
unconstitutional in Stonington Vineyards, Inc. v. Jenkins.
160
 In 
response to Stonington Vineyards, the Massachusetts legislature 
amended the exception so that it excluded wineries based on a 
production limit instead of their out-of-state location. The new 
                                                                                                                 
156 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994) (holding that a 
Massachusetts pricing order was unconstitutional because it created barriers that eliminated the 
economic advantages enjoyed by out-of-state milk producers). 
157 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
158 600 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010). 
159 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 7. 
160 No. 1:05-cv-10982-JLT (D. Mass. Oct. 5, 2005). 
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exception applied to all ―small‖ wineries—those producing no more 
than 30,000 gallons of grape wine annually—and allowed them to 
combine distribution methods by selling to wholesalers, retailers, and 
consumers simultaneously. The legislature also created a new 
exception for the remaining ―large‖ wineries. These wineries were 
given the choice of selling only to wholesalers (i.e., remaining in the 
three-tier system) or selling only to consumers.
161
 In other words, 
unlike the exception for small wineries, the direct-shipping option 
available to large wineries did not allow them to continue wholesale 
distribution and it authorized direct sales only to consumers, not to 
retailers. 
The Family Winemakers plaintiffs argued that these new 
provisions violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court 
granted their motion for summary judgment, finding the provisions to 
be discriminatory in purpose and effect; the court also noted that even 
if the provisions were not discriminatory, they still failed the Pike 
balancing test.
162
 District Court Judge Rya W. Zobel‘s analysis for 
each of these findings is worthy of discussion, as are the arguments 
Massachusetts advanced on appeal, and the First Circuit‘s selective 
clarification of the various issues raised. 
1. Discriminatory Purpose 
Judge Zobel first addressed the exceptions‘ discriminatory 
purpose. In her statement of the facts, Judge Zobel discussed the 
history of the bill‘s passage, including damning statements made by 
the bill‘s sponsors and Massachusetts winery and wholesaler 
lobbyists, who were involved in the drafting process.
163
 For example, 
the wholesaler lobbyists initially argued against allowing any sort of 
direct shipping; but once they could see that they were going to lose 
that battle, they shifted their focus to arguing for a very low 
production limit. In response to this request, the bill was revised to 
lower the production limit from 50,000 gallons to 30,000 gallons. At 
that point, the owner of Massachusetts‘s largest winery voiced his 
concern. Although he currently produced fewer than 30,000 gallons, 
he feared that he might surpass the limit in the near future because he 
made a lot of apple wine in addition to grape wine.
164
 The final 
                                                                                                                 
161 See Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 7–8. 
162 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112074, *41–42 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
163 See id. at *13–22.  
164 Id. at *15–16. 
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version of the bill kept the 30,000-gallon production limit but 
provided that only grape wine would count toward that limit.
165
  
During debate in the Massachusetts Senate, Senator Morrissey 
pointed out that Massachusetts wholesalers were protected because 
most wine would still go through the three-tier system because the 
―choice‖ given to ―large‖ wineries was really a false one. He 
reasoned, ―[Y]ou got to think they are going to go with the wholesaler 
because they can‘t move that much wine. So they are going to use the 
wholesale market. So it‘s a very small percentage [of wineries which 
may choose direct sales over wholesalers]. But we give them a 
choice.‖166 He also observed, ―[I]ronically, with the limitations that 
we are suggesting in the legislation, we are really still giving an 
inherent advantage indirectly to the local wineries.‖167 This 
observation alludes to the fact that 100% of Massachusetts wine is 
made by ―small‖ wineries that can take advantage of the economic 
benefits of direct shipping, whereas ninety-eight percent of out-of-
state wine is produced by ―large‖ wineries, which will most likely 
have to use a Massachusetts wholesaler to reach the Massachusetts 
market.
168
 
Judge Zobel felt that Senator Morrissey‘s comments and the events 
leading up to the bill‘s passage supported the plaintiffs‘ argument that 
the exceptions were ―designed to allow all in-state wineries to 
continue direct shipping while forcing the majority of interstate wine 
to go through the three-tier system, thereby preserving the economic 
interests of both Massachusetts wholesalers and Massachusetts 
wineries.‖169 She seemed to place the most weight on the inexplicable 
exemption of nongrape wine, the false choice given to ―large‖ 
wineries, and Senator Morrissey‘s comment about indirectly 
advantaging in-state wineries.
170
 She rejected Massachusetts‘s 
argument that the purpose of the exemptions was to level the playing 
field for small wineries, which have historically had difficulty 
obtaining wholesaler representation. But Judge Zobel did not fully 
articulate her reason for rejecting this argument, stating only that ―it 
does not logically follow that aiding ‗small‘ wineries must be done at 
the expense of burdening ‗large‘ wineries with the more onerous 
requirements of § 19F(a) [the provision forcing large wineries to 
choose between the three-tier system or direct shipping only to 
                                                                                                                 
165 Id. at *10. 
166 Id. at *20 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167 Id. at *21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
168 See id. at *34. 
169 Id. at *27–28. 
170 See id. at *20–21.  
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consumers].‖171 Judge Zobel‘s explanation is problematic because it 
does not actually explain why Massachusetts‘s asserted purpose is not 
legitimate; instead, it seems to implicitly attack the three-tier system 
itself by arguing that the liberal small-winery exemption should be 
extended to all wineries because large wineries are also burdened 
when forced to sell only to wholesalers.  
On appeal, the First Circuit upheld the district court‘s finding of 
discriminatory purpose, but only after discussing and upholding the 
finding of discriminatory effect.
172
 In discussing discriminatory 
purpose, the First Circuit relied on the test it had developed in 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Gwadosky.
173
 The Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers test focuses on the statute as a whole, 
including its language, context, and legislative history; but it also 
considers whether the statute is closely tailored to achieve the 
purported legislative purpose.
174
 Although Massachusetts‘s 
production-limit provisions did not contain a stated statutory purpose, 
the court found other evidence of discriminatory purpose on which to 
base its holding. First, the new provisions were codified near other 
statutory exceptions to Massachusetts‘s three-tier system, many of 
which did explicitly state that their purpose was to assist 
Massachusetts industries, such as breweries and distilleries. Second, 
the legislators‘ statements evidenced an intent to benefit the local 
wine industry. And third, the fact that the provisions were 
discriminatory in effect undercut the argument that they were 
motivated by a nondiscriminatory purpose.
175
  
Interestingly, the court stressed that its finding of discriminatory 
purpose was ―not dependent on the many statements of discriminatory 
purpose by lobbyists and the intermediate steps in the legislative 
process the district court relied upon in its opinion.‖176 It is unclear 
why the First Circuit shunned these factors; at the district court level, 
Judge Zobel explained their relevance by quoting from Edwards v. 
Aguillard.
177
  
The plain meaning of the statute‘s words, enlightened by their 
context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can 
control the determination of legislative purpose. Moreover, in 
determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has 
                                                                                                                 
171 Id. at *32. 
172 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2010). 
173 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005). 
174 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 13. 
175 Id. at 14. 
176 Id. at 17 n.22. 
177 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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also considered the historical context of the statute and the 
specific sequence of events leading to passage of the 
statute.
178
 
In fact, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the First Circuit 
itself declared that ―context is a critically important interpretive tool,‖ 
and cited Edwards v. Aguillard.
179
 In any case, whatever the factors, 
the First Circuit came to the same conclusion as the district court—
that the production limit was discriminatory in purpose. 
The First Circuit more clearly explained why Massachusetts‘s 
asserted purpose (to level the playing field for small wineries) was 
questionable. The selection of a 30,000-gallon grape-wine production 
limit has no apparent correlation to the goal of helping small wineries. 
The wine industry defines small wineries as those producing fewer 
than 120,000 gallons annually of any type of wine, not just grape 
wine. The federal government gives tax breaks to wineries producing 
250,000 gallons or fewer annually of any type of wine. Of the other 
states that have adopted production limits, none has chosen 30,000 
gallons as its cutoff and none has exempted nongrape wine. 
Moreover, if the goal is to help those wineries that struggle to find 
wholesaler representation, then almost all wineries should be included 
because only the largest fifty to 100 wineries in the United States are 
able to distribute most of their wines through wholesalers.
180
 What the 
30,000-gallon grape-wine limit does correlate to is the makeup of the 
Massachusetts wine industry. All thirty-one of Massachusetts‘s 
wineries produce between 200 and 24,000 gallons of grape wine 
annually. Significantly, Massachusetts‘s largest winery has produced 
more than 30,000 gallons of wine in past years, but between half and 
three-quarters of that was apple wine.
181
 Given these facts, the court 
did not believe Massachusetts that the true purpose of the provision 
was to help small wineries. 
The First Circuit‘s discussion of discriminatory purpose, however, 
left two important questions unanswered: what the proper test for 
discriminatory purpose in the context of dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges is and whether a finding of discriminatory purpose on its 
own is sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny. First, the court chose 
to use its own discriminatory-purpose test without any justification. In 
                                                                                                                 
178 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112074, at *26–27 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 (citations 
omitted)), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
179 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). 
180 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 12, 15–16. 
181 Id. at 16–17. 
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a footnote, the court admitted that other courts have looked to a wider 
range of factors than those listed in Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers and that some have even used the discriminatory-
purpose test laid out in Equal Protection Clause cases. But instead of 
giving a reasoned basis for rejecting those tests, the court merely 
decided that because it found that Massachusetts‘s production limit 
had a discriminatory purpose under the narrower Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers test, it need not look to other factors or 
consider whether Equal Protection analysis is appropriate in the 
Commerce Clause context.
182
 
Second, the court made a conscious choice to affirm the district 
court‘s finding of discriminatory effect before reaching the question 
of discriminatory purpose. Then, after finding discriminatory purpose 
as well, the court reasoned that ―when . . . a state statute is both 
discriminatory in effect and in purpose, it is clearly discriminatory 
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, and we need not 
address whether evidence of a legislative intent to discriminate would 
suffice on its own.‖183 The First Circuit had sidestepped this question 
in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as well. In that decision, it 
noted that despite Bacchus‘s assertion that ―[a] finding that state 
legislation constitutes ‗economic protectionism‘ may be made on the 
basis of either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect,‖184 
there is still some doubt as to ―whether a showing of discriminatory 
purpose alone will invariably suffice to support a finding of 
constitutional invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause.‖185 
It is unfortunate that the sufficiency of discriminatory purpose 
remains an open question because it is at the heart of the problem. 
After the Granholm decision, states with [facially] 
discriminatory laws on their books had to make a choice: they 
could either ―level up‖ by extending direct-shipping 
privileges to out-of-state wineries, or ―level down‖ by 
revoking such privileges from in-state wineries. The good 
news for competition and consumers is that to date no state 
has leveled down by completely prohibiting wine direct 
shipping. The bad news is that several states that nominally 
leveled up have moved ―sideways‖ by levying new 
restrictions—including on-site purchase requirements and 
                                                                                                                 
182 Id. at 13–14 & n.15. 
183 Id. at 14 n.16. 
184 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 36 (emphasis added) (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185 Id. at 36 n.3. 
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production limitations—on direct shipping, which typically 
fall more heavily on out-of-state producers. In some cases, 
such restrictions effectively make direct shipping by out-of-
state wineries economically impossible.
186
 
It seems highly likely that these states moved ―sideways‖ in an 
attempt to retain as much of the in-state advantage as possible while 
avoiding constitutional challenges under Granholm. This is exactly 
what Massachusetts did when it transformed its facially 
discriminatory direct-shipping law into a facially neutral (but still 
discriminatory) production limit after Stonington Vineyards. Because 
it is highly likely that many of these post-Granholm provisions were 
passed with a discriminatory purpose, and because courts are not 
applying the discriminatory-effect test consistently, it is important to 
clarify the proper test for discriminatory purpose and to determine 
whether a finding of discriminatory purpose alone is sufficient to 
trigger heightened scrutiny. 
2. Discriminatory Effect 
Determining whether a production limit is discriminatory in effect 
is difficult for several reasons. First, the Baldacci court proclaimed 
that plaintiffs must provide substantial evidence of discriminatory 
effect, but it is unclear what exactly that means. Second, it is unclear 
how courts should measure the burden that these laws place on 
interstate commerce. Part of that uncertainty stems from the fact that 
the U.S. wine industry is very top heavy. Under Massachusetts‘s 
scheme, only eleven percent of all U.S. wineries were excluded from 
the liberal small-winery direct-shipping provision; but those eleven 
percent account for ninety-eight percent of U.S. wine production.
187
  
The plaintiffs argued that the scheme was discriminatory in effect 
because it allowed 100% of Massachusetts‘s wine to be shipped 
directly while essentially preventing ninety-eight percent of out-of-
state wine from being shipped directly. Massachusetts argued that the 
production limit was not discriminatory because it allowed eighty-
nine percent of all wineries in the country to ship directly to 
Massachusetts, and most of those wineries are located outside of 
Massachusetts.
188
 Judge Zobel adopted the plaintiffs‘ interpretation, 
pointing to Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland‘s189 pronouncement 
                                                                                                                 
186 Ohlhausen & Luib, supra note 24, at 506 (footnote omitted). 
187 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112074, at *23 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
188 Id. at *33–34. 
189 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that a Maryland law prohibiting producers or refiners 
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that ―the [Commerce] Clause protects the interstate market, not 
particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome 
regulations.‖190 The Exxon Court meant that just because a few out-
of-state businesses are burdened by a law does not mean that it is 
unconstitutional because the relevant inquiry is whether the interstate 
market as a whole is burdened. Interestingly, Family Winemakers 
presents the opposite situation; most out-of-state wineries are not 
burdened by the production limit, but the group that is burdened 
accounts for ninety-eight percent of the market. 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court‘s finding of 
discriminatory effect. It claimed to uphold this finding under the same 
substantial-evidence standard it used in Baldacci. The First Circuit 
noted that in Baldacci, the plaintiffs had conceded that Maine‘s face-
to-face requirement was nondiscriminatory in purpose; therefore, 
Baldacci had not addressed ―whether a lesser showing might suffice 
when a law is allegedly discriminatory in both effect and purpose.‖191 
The court did not address this issue in Family Winemakers either 
because it was able to find that Massachusetts‘s scheme was 
discriminatory in effect even under the higher Baldacci standard.  
The First Circuit noted that Massachusetts‘s scheme confers a 
clear competitive advantage on small wineries, which include all 
Massachusetts wineries, and places large wineries, all of which are 
out-of-state, at a comparative disadvantage. The court emphasized 
that even though the small-winery exemption is available to 
thousands of out-of-state wineries, only twenty-six have actually 
applied for Massachusetts‘s small-winery license. In contrast, twenty-
seven of Massachusetts‘s thirty-one wineries have applied for the 
license. Additionally, those twenty-seven in-state wineries actually 
benefit from the license; in 2007, they made seventy-one percent of 
their sales through the alternative outlets created in the small-winery 
exemption provision.
192
 This evidence helped the court distinguish 
Baldacci. This is evidence that Massachusetts wineries actually 
benefit from the law. In contrast, the Baldacci plaintiffs produced no 
evidence that people actually visit Maine wineries and purchase 
wine.
193
 
The court also emphasized that the exemptions did not do what 
Massachusetts claimed they were meant to do: level the playing field 
                                                                                                                 
 
from operating retail service stations within the State does not violate the Due Process Clause). 
190 Id. at 127–28, quoted in Family Winemakers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112074, at *33. 
191 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 11 n.11 (1st Cir. 2010). 
192 Id. at 11 & n.12. 
193 Id. at 12 n.13. 
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for wineries that do not have stable wholesaler representation. On the 
contrary, many wineries that qualify as ―large‖ under Massachusetts‘s 
scheme are not large enough to obtain stable wholesaler 
representation, so they are put at a particular disadvantage—they 
cannot fully function in the three-tier system and they cannot use the 
liberal direct-shipping provision either.
194
 
Massachusetts responded by arguing that Granholm applies only 
to facially discriminatory laws. In other words, the Twenty-First 
Amendment still protects laws that are merely discriminatory in 
purpose or effect.
195
 Presumably, Massachusetts meant that its 
production limit should be upheld despite its discriminatory effect and 
purpose because it advanced core Twenty-First Amendment concerns. 
But the Commonwealth did not say this explicitly or even allude to 
which core concerns it thought the production limit promoted. The 
First Circuit noted that it is unclear whether the core-concerns 
balancing test survived Granholm; but it went on to hold, ―[T]he 
Twenty-first Amendment does not exempt facially neutral state 
alcohol laws with discriminatory effects from the non-discrimination 
rule of the Commerce Clause. Nor, of course, are such laws exempt 
when they also discriminate by design.‖196 This holding does not 
extend the Granholm rule; instead, it simply recognizes that it would 
be illogical to interpret Granholm as applying only to facially 
discriminatory laws. The First Circuit essentially clarified that the 
core-concerns test can no longer be applied to discriminatory laws.
197
 
The remaining question is whether the core-concerns test is still 
relevant to the Pike analysis.  
3. Pike Balancing Test 
Judge Zobel concluded her analysis of Massachusetts‘s direct-
shipping scheme by noting that even if the exceptions were not 
discriminatory in purpose or effect, they would still fail the Pike 
balancing test. Under Massachusetts‘s scheme, large wineries 
effectively may sell only to wholesalers. Such restrictions burden 
interstate commerce. She felt that the scheme served no local 
benefit.
198
 Even if one accepts Massachusetts‘s argument that the 
                                                                                                                 
194 See id. at 12. 
195 Id. at 18–19. 
196 Id. at 20–21. 
197 One could argue that the First Circuit‘s holding left some room to apply the core-
concerns test to laws that are discriminatory only in purpose. This is just another way of 
phrasing the question the court raised earlier—that is, whether a finding of discriminatory 
purpose alone is sufficient to invoke heightened scrutiny. 
198 Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 06-11682-RWZ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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scheme helps small wineries nationwide, she felt that this goal would 
not be undercut by allowing the large wineries to ship directly as 
well.
199
 
On appeal, Massachusetts argued that the Twenty-First 
Amendment and the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts foreclose the 
plaintiffs‘ claim under Pike and that Granholm supports this 
position.
200
 Indeed, Gregory Durkin has argued that Granholm should 
be interpreted as establishing that nondiscriminatory state laws 
regulating alcohol and closely advancing a core concern of the 
Twenty-First Amendment cannot be invalidated under Pike.
201
 But the 
First Circuit declined to address this issue, stating that because it 
found the laws to be discriminatory in effect and in purpose, it did not 
need to decide whether the Twenty-First Amendment immunizes 
nondiscriminatory laws that fail the Pike balancing test.
202
  
B. Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver 
In Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, the plaintiffs challenged the 
production-limit exception to Arizona‘s three-tier system.203 The 
exception allows wineries producing fewer than 20,000 gallons of 
wine annually to ship an unlimited amount of wine directly to all 
Arizona customers and retailers. Twenty-six of Arizona‘s twenty-
seven wineries produce fewer than 20,000 gallons of wine 
annually.
204 The plaintiffs argued that this exception discriminates 
against the hundreds of out-of-state wineries that produce more than 
20,000 gallons of wine annually because those wineries are 
essentially forced to go through Arizona‘s three-tier system and 
endure wholesaler markups, whereas all but one of Arizona‘s 
wineries are completely exempt from the three-tier system, giving 
them preferential access to Arizona customers.
205 
The district court rejected this argument. It reasoned that 
preferential access implies that in-state wineries benefit to the 
exclusion of out-of-state wineries, which is not what the production 
                                                                                                                 
 
112074, at *41 (D. Mass. Nov. 19, 2008), aff’d, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
199 Id. at *41–42. 
200 The Commonwealth pointed out that although Baude v. Heath applied Pike to an 
alcohol regulation, it apparently did so without any objection from the parties. Reply Brief of 
Appellants at 26–27, Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d 1 (No. 09-1169). 
201 See Durkin, supra note 63, at 1108 n.72. 
202 Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 19 n.27. 
203 Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 544 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d, 600 
F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2010). 
204 Id. at 917. 
205 Id. at 918. 
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limit does. More than half of all U.S. wineries produce fewer than 
20,000 gallons of wine annually and are therefore eligible for direct-
shipping privileges in Arizona. Given that only twenty-six of these 
eligible wineries are in Arizona, the benefits of this privilege go 
mainly to out-of-state wineries.
206
  
The mere fact that all but one of the excluded wineries happen to 
be out-of-state does not mean that the law is discriminatory in 
effect.
207
 The court analogized this situation to Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co.
208
 In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Supreme Court 
upheld a Minnesota law that prohibited the sale of milk in plastic 
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitted sales in other 
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk 
cartons.
209
 The Black Star Farms court latched onto the similarity that 
the Minnesota law benefited the paper industry, which consisted of 
both in-state and out-of-state companies, and burdened the plastics 
industry, which consisted entirely of out-of-state companies.
210
  
As a result, the Black Star Farms court wanted the plaintiffs to 
present substantial evidence showing that the production limit had the 
effect of increasing in-state wineries‘ proportional share of the 
market.
211
 The court noted that showing that some out-of-state 
wineries missed out on sales is not sufficient.  
[S]urely out-of-state wineries are subject to lost sales under 
the ―unquestionably legitimate‖ three-tiered distribution 
system [as well]. Lost sales are troublesome . . . only to the 
extent that a state‘s statutory scheme is designed to favor in-
state wineries, such that in-state wineries are able to gain a 
greater share of the market.
212
  
The court concluded that although the production limit does 
effectively prevent some out-of-state wineries from shipping directly 
to Arizona consumers, ―those wineries may still gain access to 
[Arizona] consumers through the State‘s three-tiered distribution 
system.‖213 Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot show that the production 
                                                                                                                 
206 Id. at 926. 
207 See id. at 918, 926. 
208 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
209 Id. at 458 n.1, 474. 
210 See Black Star Farms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 923–24. 
211 See id. at 927. The court did not say whether it took this ―substantial evidence‖ standard 
from Baldacci. But on appeal, the attorney for the State urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt the 
Baldacci standard. See Oral Argument at 19:57, Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225 
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15738), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage 
.php?pk_id=0000003915. 
212 Black Star Farms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
213 Id. at 928. 
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limit ―somehow alter[s] the proportional share of the State‘s wine 
market in favor of in-state wineries.‖214 The fact that more out-of-
state wineries than in-state wineries are required to use the three-tier 
system does not establish a discriminatory effect. ―That fact at best 
supports the contention that Arizona‘s statutory scheme places an 
incidental burden on interstate commerce.‖215 But the court declined 
to analyze whether the law‘s burdens outweigh its benefits because 
the plaintiffs had not challenged the law under Pike.
216
 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s holding 
that the exception was not discriminatory in effect.
217
 The court 
framed the issue as ―whether Arizona‘s statutory scheme for 
regulating the shipment of wine to consumers has the practical effect 
of ‗favor[ing] in-state economic interests over out-of-state 
interests.‘‖218 The court adopted Baldacci‘s substantial-evidence 
standard and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide substantial 
evidence that the exception has an actual adverse effect on interstate 
commerce.
219
 On the contrary, almost twice as many out-of-state 
wineries as in-state wineries have obtained the direct-shipping 
license.
220
  
Black Star Farms may have had better luck if it had argued that the 
production limit was also discriminatory in purpose. Prior to 
Granholm v. Heald, Arizona had a facially discriminatory small-
winery exception. Wineries that produced no more than 75,000 
gallons of wine annually were eligible for direct-shipping privileges, 
but only if seventy-five percent of their wine was produced from 
grapes grown in Arizona.
221
 After Granholm, the Arizona legislature 
revised the law so that it would be nondiscriminatory and in 
conformance with Granholm. But instead of merely removing the 
requirement that seventy-five percent of the grapes come from 
Arizona, the legislature also lowered the production limit from 75,000 
gallons to 20,000 gallons.
222
 The only apparent purpose of lowering 
the production limit is to exclude as many out-of-state wineries as 
possible while still allowing in-state wineries to ship directly. In fact, 
                                                                                                                 
214 Id. at 927. 
215 Id. at 928. 
216 Id.  
217 Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2010).  
218 Id. at 1231 (alteration in original) (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 
(2005)). 
219 See id. (agreeing with the district court‘s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet its 
burden of offering substantial evidence of an actual discriminatory effect). 
220 Id. at 1232. 
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Senator Ken Cheuvront, who sponsored the bill that lowered the 
production limit, admitted that the production limit was ―chosen by 
the legislature in order to ‗take care of‘ the Arizona wineries and 
protect their economic viability. Senator Cheuvront . . . testified that 
‗the specific purpose of the new legislation . . . was to secure that the 
Arizona wineries were included except Kokopelli and thus permit 
them to ship in-state.‘‖223 Unfortunately, Black Star Farms did not 
pursue the discriminatory-purpose argument on appeal, reasoning that 
―it does not matter if the legislature had protectionist intent, because a 
finding that state legislation constitutes economic protectionism may 
be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose or 
discriminatory effect.‖224 
C. Proposed Analysis of Production Limits 
One of the questions that arise when analyzing the constitutionality 
of a production limit is whether to focus on the amount of out-of-state 
wine excluded or the number of out-of-state wineries excluded. The 
First and Ninth Circuits‘ analyses differed in this respect. The Family 
Winemakers court focused on the fact that Massachusetts‘s 
production limit excluded ninety-eight percent of out-of-state wine. 
The Black Star Farms court focused on the fact that Arizona‘s 
production limit excluded fewer than half of out-of-state wineries. 
Focusing on the number of wineries, however, obscures the fact that 
the U.S. wine industry is very top heavy and geographically 
unbalanced. California, Oregon, and Washington wineries alone 
account for ninety-three percent of U.S. wine production.
225
 
Consequently, any state other than California, Oregon or Washington 
can draft a direct-shipping provision that is available to most out-of-
state wineries while at the same time excluding almost all out-of-state 
wine. Therefore, in order to take into account the realities of the wine 
industry, courts should focus on the amount of out-of-state wine 
excluded by a production limit—not the number of wineries. 
But even if the Ninth Circuit had taken this approach, it likely still 
would have concluded that Arizona‘s production limit is not 
discriminatory in effect. Even though the production limit excludes 
the vast majority of out-of-state wine, some out-of-state wine can 
                                                                                                                 
223 Opening Brief of Appellants at 11, Black Star Farms, 600 F.3d 1225 (No. 08-15738), 
2009 WL 2444182 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Cheuvront Affidavit ¶¶ 7–8). 
Kokopelli is the only Arizona winery that produces more than 20,000 gallons of wine annually. 
It has wholesaler representation and does not desire to ship directly to customers. Id. at 11 n.5. 
224 Black Star Farms, 600 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added) (quoting Reply Brief of 
Appellants at 24, 2009 WL 2444186) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1. 
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benefit from the exception. In fact, most of the wine that can benefit 
from the law will be from out-of-state; only twenty-seven of the 
thousands of ―small‖ wineries in the United States are located in 
Arizona. Therefore, the exception does not benefit solely—or even 
mostly—in-state wine. 
The second question that arises is how to determine whether a 
production limit ―burdens‖ out-of-state economic interests. The First 
Circuit found that the ―large‖ wineries, all of which were out-of-state, 
were burdened because no matter which option they chose (selling 
only to wholesalers or selling only to consumers), they would lose 
sales compared to the small wineries, which could combine all three 
distribution methods. Essentially, the First Circuit analyzed 
Massachusetts‘s alcohol distribution scheme as a whole and 
concluded that the three-tier system plus its exceptions benefited all 
in-state wine and burdened virtually all out-of-state wine. By contrast, 
the Ninth Circuit analyzed only the production-limit provision. It 
concluded that the exception did not burden the ―large‖ wineries 
because it did not put any new requirements on them. The large 
wineries could still sell only to wholesalers, as was the case before the 
exception existed. While the Ninth Circuit‘s approach seems myopic, 
it avoids the conclusion that the three-tier system as a whole is 
discriminatory in effect. That would be an uncomfortable conclusion 
for a court of appeals to reach given that the Granholm Court 
emphasized that the three-tier system remains unquestionably 
legitimate.
226
  
While considering a state‘s entire alcohol distribution scheme in 
light of the realities of the U.S. wine market seems to be the more 
logical approach, courts may decline to follow the First Circuit to 
avoid having to find the three-tier system discriminatory in effect. But 
even if courts follow the Ninth Circuit‘s discriminatory-effect 
analysis, they could still find production limits to be discriminatory in 
purpose. Unless a state‘s production limit reflects the volume at 
which a winery can achieve stable wholesale distribution, it is 
probably discriminatory in purpose. The only reason to set the limit 
any lower than that is to exclude midsize out-of-state wineries that 
might otherwise compete with the state‘s small wineries in the direct-
shipping market. Because the use of a low production limit is clearly 
an attempt to sidestep Granholm, the discriminatory-purpose test is an 
important tool for direct-shipping advocates. Consequently, it is 
                                                                                                                 
226 This is essentially what the Family Winemakers court held, but the First Circuit 
obfuscated the holding by referring to ―§ 19F‖ when in reality it was discussing the effects of 
Massachusetts‘s three-tier system as a whole. See Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 
F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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unfortunate that the Family Winemakers court did not clarify the test 
for discriminatory purpose nor address whether discriminatory 
purpose alone could trigger heightened scrutiny.  
DIGESTIF 
Going forward, courts should follow the examples set by the 
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in Baude v. Heath, 
the Sixth Circuit in Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly, and the First 
Circuit in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins—that is, to 
give proper weight to the realities of the wine industry when 
considering the constitutionality of narrow direct-shipping exceptions 
to states‘ three-tier systems. One of the realities that should be 
confronted is that the vast majority of U.S. wines do not make it 
through the three-tier system to retail shelves. Given that fact, it 
becomes hard not to question whether the three-tier system as a whole 
remains constitutional.  
Although the Granhom Court pronounced that the three-tier 
system remains unquestionably legitimate, ―there is good reason to 
doubt the efficacy of such boilerplate language.‖227 Professor Tanford 
argues that the three-tier system is the quintessential dormant 
Commerce Clause violation: it ―closes the market to most out-of-state 
wineries, serves no public interest, and economically benefits only the 
wholesalers.‖228 Tanford also argues that the Twenty-First 
Amendment does not save the three-tier system because it was meant 
only to ―give states power to regulate local production and sale within 
their borders, and to prohibit interstate commerce in violation of local 
dry laws.‖229 The Granholm Court itself emphasized that the Twenty-
First Amendment does not supersede the dormant Commerce 
Clause.
230
 Tanford has concluded,  
One cannot realistically argue that the Twenty-First 
Amendment gave wet states the power to erect trade barriers 
that prevent nonresidents from selling wine, to give 
preferential access to the market to local wine sellers, or to 
protect the economic interest of in-state wholesalers. That is 
                                                                                                                 
227 Tanford, supra note 11, at 329. 
228 Id. The reason states‘ three-tier systems close the market only to most out-of-state 
wineries is that most wineries are in California and California does not have a three-tier system, 
therefore, there is no state with a three-tier system that acts to exclude mostly in-state wineries. 
See Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1. 
229 Tanford, supra note 11, at 330. 
230 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 486 (2005) (―[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does 
not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule 
that the States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.‖). 
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what the three-tier system does, and Granholm suggests that 
its days may be numbered.
231
 
Professor Tanford makes some good observations in support of his 
argument that the three-tier system is no longer constitutional, but he 
does not invoke the nonfungibility of wine as part this attack. Given 
that at least two courts have considered wine‘s uniqueness when 
analyzing exceptions to states‘ three-tier systems, one wonders 
whether the nonfungibility argument could bolster the more ambitious 
claim that the three-tier system itself is unconstitutional. In other 
words, can we attack the three-tier system with terroir? 
The claim is that because each wine—and each of our palates232—
is unique, a system in which the wholesalers dictate which wines we 
may have access to is unacceptable. This argument may have less to 
do with how a state‘s three-tier system burdens interstate commerce 
and more to do with how it burdens the state‘s own consumers. It 
helps explain why wine consumers find restrictions on wine 
distribution to be unfair; if a consumer cannot purchase the wine he 
wants, there is literally nothing he can replace it with that will taste 
the same. And this is not trivial because ―[w]ine does not just give 
pleasure. It is . . . a product which has a substantial and far-ranging 
symbolic significance.‖233 Terroir is an important part of this 
significance. For example, it embodies ―a collective taste memory, 
which has matured over a long time, through several generations of 
people . . . .‖234 Terroir helps explain why wine is culturally 
important. Of course, it also means that the wine industry can produce 
an endless supply of different wines to sell, which makes the industry 
economically important.
235
 It is an industry that we should try to 
foster, not unquestioningly restrict because the Rehnquist Court said 
that was okay in a plurality opinion from twenty years ago.
236
 
                                                                                                                 
231 Tanford, supra note 11, at 330.  
232 ―The first thing you should consider after you‘ve tasted a wine is whether or not you 
like it. Is it your style? . . . The definition of a good wine is one that you enjoy. I cannot 
emphasize this enough. Trust your own palate and do not let others dictate taste to you!‖ ZRALY, 
supra note 3, at 13. 
233 STEVE CHARTERS, WINE AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF A 
DRINK 5 (2006). 
234 Id. at 107 (quoting Emmanuelle Vaudour, The Quality of Grapes and Wine in Relation 
to Geography: Notions of Terroir at Various Scales, 13 J. WINE RESEARCH 121 (2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
235 In 2005, the retail value of U.S. wines totaled $23.8 billion. Barbara Insel, The U.S. 
Wine Industry, 43 BUS. ECON. 68, 68 (2008). 
236 See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(describing North Dakota‘s three-tier system as ―unquestionably legitimate‖). 
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Of course, when criticizing these undesirable effects of the three-
tier system, one must not lose sight of the fact that some of them were 
actually intended. Alcohol is a commodity that provides 
many acceptable outcomes [but] at the same time can be the 
cause[] of tremendous social strife. . . . [T]he challenge for 
government is to provide a realistic system for its 
accessibility while at the same time attempting to limit its 
abusive consumption through controlled access. . . .  
The present regulatory scheme in some states requires a 
minimum markup price for wholesale and retail tiers. The 
intention here is not to guarantee a profit to wholesale and 
retailers at the expense of the consumer, but to maintain 
alcohol at a certain price level so that it cannot become too 
cheap and therefore easily accessible. . . .  
Deregulators looking at this relationship through a lens of 
pure economic theory miss the . . . proposition of intentional 
fractionalization using a middle tier as the monopoly. . . . 
State laws that may appear to make no sense in an ordinary 
economic model . . . are easily understood within the context 
of what was intended in 1933, and now need[] to be analyzed 
from a 21st amendment perspective instead of an economic 
one.
237
 
Although it is true that one must be sensitive to the safety and 
public-health concerns surrounding alcohol consumption, it is also 
important to recognize that the goal is to have a realistic system for 
accessibility. Instead, over the past few decades, the current system 
has become a ―three-tier non-distribution system.‖238 The explosion of 
small producers, the consolidation of the wholesale tier, and the rise 
of the Internet and e-commerce have combined to make the current 
regime inadequate. Significantly, California, Oregon, and 
Washington, which collectively account for ninety-three percent of 
U.S. wine production, have all abandoned the three-tier system in 
favor of a two-tier system in which retailers can purchase directly 
from producers.
239
 They also all allow direct shipping without any 
face-to-face purchase requirements or production limits.
240
 Even with 
                                                                                                                 
237 Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter, Why We Control Alcohol the Way We Do, in 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL 7–9 (Carole L. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter 
eds., 2008) (citation omitted). 
238 Tanford, supra note 11, at 303. 
239 Wiggins, supra note 25, at 1. 
240 See State Shipping Laws Map, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant 
.com/Home.aspx?SaleTypeID=1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).  
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these liberalizations, there are still ways to limit abusive consumption. 
For example, Oregon limits the number of cases a customer can 
purchase directly from a winery.
241
 These states serve as examples of 
how to evolve beyond the three-tier system in a responsible way.  
As the Wine Wars continue, direct-shipping advocates should 
emphasize wine‘s nonfungibility and its cultural significance as well 
as the economic importance of the wine industry. Using California, 
Oregon, and Washington as examples, states should modernize their 
alcohol distribution systems in ways that responsibly foster the wine 
industry as a whole, not just their local wineries. 
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241 See State Shipping Laws: Oregon, WINE INSTITUTE, http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant 
.com/StateDetail.aspx?StateId=15 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (summarizing Oregon wine 
shipment laws).In reality this might do little to curb alcohol abuse. Even with access to only one 
bottle of wine, one can drink an excessive amount. States cannot really limit consumers‘ access 
to alcohol enough to stop abusive consumption. To stop abusive consumption, states need to 
focus on things like education and effective enforcement of drunk-driving laws. 
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